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Abstract
This paper investigates the issue of rational expectations using inflation forecasts
from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Green Book. We provide
an alternative test of rational expectations hypothesis by measuring the degree
of persistence of potential systematic mistakes. The test is obtained by solving a
signal extraction problem that distinguishes between systematic and non-systematic
forecast errors. The findings indicate highly persistent systematic mistakes, which
are driven by the inefficient use of available information, and reject the rational
expectations hypothesis. The estimated time-varying bias can be used to improve
the SPF and Green Book inflation forecast performance by at least 13.4%. This
paper also documents evidence that the real interest rate plays a crucial role in
explaining the level of bias that leads to under- and over predictions of actual
inflation.
JEL Classification: D84,E31,E37
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1 Introduction
“Undoubtedly, the state of inflation expectations greatly influences actual inflation and
thus the central bank’s ability to achieve price stability.”–Bernanke 2007–
Inflation forecasts play an important role in determining the interest rate, thereby
affecting other key macroeconomic variables. Although the accuracy of these forecasts is
of great importance, forecasters have made mistakes in predicting future inflation rate.
In particular, there was a tendency to under-predict actual inflation before 1980 and after
2000, but over-predict it between 1980 and 2000. Although these mistakes have been
repeated for the past four decades, the literature does not provide a satisfactory expla-
nation for systematic mistakes (biases) in the observed inflation expectations (Capistra´n
and Timmermann 2009). In response to this challenge, this paper provides a method to
verify the potential existence and source of systematic mistakes in inflation forecasts.1 In
addition, it introduces a method to reduce these errors. We also propose a new test for
rational expectations, which is closely related to the existence of systematic mistakes.
To dates, there is still an ongoing debate about rational expectations. Romer and
Romer (2000) and Ball and Croushore (2003) provide evidence in favor of the ratio-
nal inflation expectations hypothesis. On the other hand, several other studies such as
Croushore (1996), Roberts (1997), Tomas (1999) and Mehra (2002), among others, present
evidence against rational expectations such as bias, inefficient use of available informa-
tion, and serial correlation in observed inflation forecasts of the SPF and the Livingston
Survey. In response to these empirical results, several studies attempt to rationalize evi-
dence that can be viewed as a rejection of the rational expectations hypothesis. Mankiw,
Reis and Wolfers (2003) try to explain forecast errors and bias based on the assumption
that economic agents update information infrequently. Capistra´n (2008) uses an asym-
metric loss function in forecasting to rationalize bias in the Green Book inflation forecasts.
Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran (2008) show that bias and serial correlation in forecast
errors can be generated by perfectly rational agents who solve a signal extraction problem
1We investigate inflation forecasts from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) and the Green
Book. The Survey of Professional Forecasters initiated by the American Statistical Association and
the National Bureau of Economic Research are currently conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The Green Book is prepared for each meeting of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC).
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to distinguish between persistent and transitory shifts in inflation targets. Other studies
explain bias using strategic behavior of forecasters (e.g., Ehrbeck and Waldmann 1996,
Laster, Bennett and Geoum 1999).
In order to examine the issue of rational expectations, we propose a new test of ratio-
nal expectations that differs from the one commonly used in the literature, which is quite
sensitive to sample size because the bias is assumed to be constant (e.g., Tomas 1999,
Romer and Romer 2000). An alternative test of the rational expectations hypothesis as-
sumes that the potential bias is time-varying. The test measures the degree of persistence
in systematic mistakes obtained by solving a signal extraction problem that distinguishes
between systematic and non-systematic forecast errors. Our findings indicate that sys-
tematic mistakes are highly persistent and predictable. Moreover, systematic mistakes are
mostly driven by the inefficient use of available information, thus rejecting the rational
expectations hypothesis.
In our methodological approach we obtain a time-varying systematic error (bias). The
estimated time-varying bias allows us to correct systematic mistakes, which improves fore-
cast accuracy. Our results show that highly predictable bias provides room to improve
forecasting performance by 21.3% for the SPF and by 16.0% for the Green Book. In
addition, the time-varying bias facilitates the identification of predictable errors because
unlike constant bias we can observe the dynamic relationship between the bias and the
variables in the information set. We document evidence that the main source of bias from
the SPF and the Green Book is attributed to the ex-post real interest rate available for
forecasters.2 Our findings indicate that the real interest rate plays a crucial role in deter-
mining the level of bias that leads to under- and over predictions of actual inflation. We
consider both the output gap and the labor share of income as potential driving sources of
inflation, which also contribute to explaining the predictable systematic errors. Finally,
we discuss the irreconcilability of our empirical findings with the rational expectations
hypothesis as well as with the efforts to rationalize bias and serial correlation of fore-
cast errors by Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003), Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran (2008),
Capistra´n (2008) and Laster, Bennett and Geoum (1999).
The contents of the paper are as follows. In section 2, we discuss a prevalent way to
test rationality and propose a more flexible alternative. We find that highly predictable
2We employ lagged values of the real interest rate that is available to forecasters when inflation
expectations are formed.
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mistakes cast doubt on the validity of the rational expectations hypothesis. In section 3,
we investigate the source of bias and find that it is mostly explained by key macroeconomic
variables. Section 4 concludes.
2 Predictable Mistakes and Irrational Bias
In order for inflation expectations to be rational, forecasts should be unbiased, that is,
forecast errors should be distributed around zero. In addition, forecasters must use all
available information in an efficient way, so that there is no predictable residual. A test
for bias has often been carried out using the following equation:
pit+1 = α+ βEˆtpit+1 + εt+1 (1)
where pit+1 and Eˆtpit+1 denote the actual inflation rate and the observed inflation expec-
tations, respectively. Lovell (1986), Tomas (1999), Romer and Romer (2000) and others
examine whether the condition for unbiasedness, the joint test of α = 0 and β = 1, is
satisfied.
When the Wald test for β = 1 does not reject the null hypothesis, we can adopt an
equivalent test for unbiasedness that can be carried out using the form:3
pit+1 − Eˆtpit+1 = α+ εt+1. (2)
The parameter α is the mean value of forecast errors or bias. A significant estimate of α
is often reported in the literature as evidence against the rational expectations hypothesis
(e.g.,Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers 2003). Although the tests based on equation (1) or (2)
have been often employed in the literature, the unbiasedness tests are quite problematic
on the grounds that the joint test of α = 0 and β = 1 in equation (1) or the test for
α = 0 in equation (2) is very sensitive to the sample period. While the use of longer
sample often leads to the conclusion of unbiasedness (e.g., Romer and Romer 2000), using
subsamples before and after 1980 tends to give rise to bias (e.g., Tomas 1999).
In order to address this issue, we employ an alternative method allowing the bias
(α) to vary over time. We set up a state-space model to decompose the forecast errors,
3When the observed inflation expectations from the SPF and the Green Book are employed, we find
that the Wald test for β = 1 does not reject the null hypothesis.
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pit+1 − Eˆtpit+1, into a systematic term (αt+1) and a non-systematic term (εt+1) as follows:
pit+1 − Eˆtpit+1 = αt+1 + εt+1 (3)
αt+1 = φαt + νt+1. (4)
We assume that νt ∼ N(0, σν) and εt ∼ N(0, σε) where εt+1 is independent of νt+1.
The time-varying bias αt follows an AR(1) process, which allows the model to capture
systematic mistakes. The coefficient φ measures the degree of persistence of potential
systematic mistakes. Note that if φ = 0, the bias turns out to be zero, which implies that
forecasters do not make predictable mistakes. On the other hand, when the estimate of
φ is statistically different from zero, the null hypothesis of rationality is rejected due to
the presence of predictable mistakes.
We estimate the unobserved bias by solving a signal extraction problem to disentan-
gle between systematic and non-systematic mistakes. This simple approach has several
advantages over assuming constant bias. First, the proposed test for rationality is not
sensitive to the sample period. Second, a time-varying bias enables us to investigate the
source of predictable mistakes because we can observe the dynamic relationship between
the bias and variables in the information set.4 Finally, our method allows us to correct
the bias, which serves to improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Table 1 displays estimates of equation (3) and (4). The sample period ranges from 1968:4
to 2005:4 for the SPF and from 1968:4 to 2001:4 for the Green Book forecasts, which
are available with a 5-year lag. The median inflation expectations of the SPF are used
in this paper. The coefficient φ is estimated to be 0.927 for the SPF and 0.916 for the
Green Book, suggesting that biases are highly persistent. The significant estimates of φ
are inconsistent with the rational expectation hypothesis since biases from the SPF and
the Green Book are highly predictable.
In order to evaluate the performance of inflation forecasts with and without bias-
corrections, we use the root mean square error (RMSE) as a measure of accuracy for the
observed inflation expectations and the bias-corrected inflation expectations. We define
the latter as the sum of the observed inflation expectations and expected future bias,
4Next section examines the source of bias.
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that is, Etpit+1 = Eˆtpit+1 + Etαt+1. The predicted bias (Etαt+1=φαt) is computed with
available information at time t. Since current inflation may be not observed in real time,
we also correct systematic mistakes after forecasting future bias with the information set
available at t− 1. Expected future bias is predicted as Et−1αt+1 = φ2αt−1 in real time.
Table 2 exhibits the RMSE for the observed inflation expectations and the bias-
corrected inflation expectations that are computed with available information at t and
t− 1. We find that the correction of bias improves the accuracy of inflation forecasts.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
While the RMSE for the SPF is 1.359, the one for the Green Book is calculated to be
1.187. Correcting the biases, which are predicted with available information at time t,
reduces the RMSEs for both forecasts, showing that bias plays a crucial role in improving
the accuracy of forecasts. For the SPF, the RMSE decreases from 1.359 to 1.069 im-
proving the accuracy by 21.3%. The Green Book forecast, which is known as one of the
most accurate predictions, can also be improved by 16.0% with bias correction. When
systematic mistakes are corrected using the predicted biases with available information
at time t − 1, the RMSEs decrease from 1.359 to 1.141, 16.0%, for the SPF and from
1.187 to 1.028, 13.4%, for the Green Book. These results show that the RMSEs could be
reduced by correcting predictable systematic mistakes.
Figure 1 displays the estimated biases and forecast errors from the SPF and the Green
Book together. The biases and forecast errors from both show similar dynamics, implying
there may be a common factor between the SPF and the Green Book.
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
In Figure 1, inflation forecasts from the SPF and the Green Book display a series of
positive or negative biases over the whole sample period. While both forecasts tend to
under-predict inflation before 1980, they tend to over-predict inflation in the 1980s and
1990s. Inflation is under-predicted again by these forecasts around the early 2000s. Several
studies document that the bias could be explained by asymmetric loss functions used in
forecasting, that is, that biased forecasts can be rationalized. In particular, Capistra´n
(2008) argues that the Fed may have different asymmetric loss functions before and after
1980. According to Capistra´n (2008), the cost of having higher inflation than the targeted
5
was smaller than the cost of having lower inflation than targeted before 1980 and the
opposite held after 1980. This argument may explain why the bias from the Green Book
is positive in the pre-Volcker era and negative in the Volcker-Greenspan period. However,
a question still remains because the bias from the SPF is similar to the one from the
Green Book. This rationale cannot be applied to the bias from the SPF forecasts since
there is no reason for commercial forecasters to have different asymmetric loss functions
before and after 1980. Since both forecast biases from the SPF and the Green Book show
quite similar dynamics, we may need a unified framework to explain those biases.
Other studies such as Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) and Laster, Bennette and Geoum
(1999) examine whether biased forecasts arise from strategic behaviors between clients
and forecasters. In particular, Laster, Bennette and Geoum (1999) develop a model in
which forecasters’ wages depend on their accuracy and their ability to attract publicity by
competing with all other forecasts. The incentive to make forecasts public compromises
the accuracy of forecasts because the publicity can be obtained from differentiating their
forecasts from the consensus (group mean forecasts as the most accurate), causing rational
bias. The publicity “enhances forecasters’ reputation, credibility and name recognition
among only occasional users, who are otherwise unfamiliar with most forecasters” (Laster,
Bennette and Geoum 1999). In this respect, occasional clients play a crucial role in
generating rational bias. However, these modeling approaches fail to explain the bias
from the Green Book forecasts since the Fed cannot be classified as an occasional client
who does not dedicate many of its resources to monitor macroeconomic forecasts. In
addition, Fed’s forecasters do not have the incentive to make forecasts public because
their forecasts are only available with a lag of 5 years. Thus, the models designed to
explain bias from commercial forecasts fail to account for the Green Book forecasts’ bias.
Andolfatto, Hendry and Moran (2008) offer a different explanation of bias in line with
Cukierman (1986). They set up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which
agents cannot distinguish between permanent and transitory shifts in inflation targets. In
their model, agents solve a signal extraction problem to disentangle the shifts, leading to
correlated forecast errors and bias. Although rationalizing bias may explain one dimension
of bias, our empirical results still cast doubt on their evidence for several reasons. First,
our findings indicate that the bias is mostly explained by publicly available information
6
at the time that forecasts are made.5 Second, their model may fail to account for why the
Fed’s internal forecasts are biased in that the Fed’s forecasters could recognize permanent
shifts in inflation targets through internal communication when they make predictions.
Finally, their explanation is at odds with our empirical results in that bias can be still
obtained from solving the signal extraction problem to disentangle the persistent and
transitory forecast errors.
3 The Sources of Bias
This section examines the underlying source of bias in inflation forecasts. We test if the
bias is predictable using available information at the time the forecasts are made. Let:
αt+1 = µ+ ψIt−k + ωt+1 (5)
where It−k for k ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4] is the information set which includes variables such as labor’s
share of income, the output gap (or the unemployment rate) and the ex-post real interest
rate. Since these variables may be not available in real time, we consider past information
sets to test for the robustness of our results. We use equation (5) to identify sources of the
bias, which can be viewed as a test of efficient use of available information. Generally in
the literature, the test of whether forecasters use information efficiently is conducted by
running a regression of forecast errors on available information. We replace the forecast
errors with the time-varying bias to examine what drives it as well as to determine whether
forecasters use information efficiently.
The effective federal fund rate is employed to calculate the ex-post real interest rate.
We employ the output gap measure provided by the Congressional Budget Office. Labor’s
share of income is taken from non-farm business sector.6
We consider the output gap and labor income share as potential driving forces of
inflation. There is no consensus in the literature regarding the driving source of inflation.
Gali and Gertler (1999) and Sbordone (2005) show that the new Keynesian Phillips curve
fits the data well with labor’s share of income rather than the output gap. Gali and Gertler
(1999) argue that labor income share measures the true economic activity better than the
5Details are explained in the following section.
6Labor’s share of income is defined as (hours worked)*(nominal wage)/(price*output), which is avail-
able from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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output gap on the grounds that the latter could suffer from considerable measurement
error of potential output. On the other hand, Rudd and Whelan (2005) favor the output
gap as a traditional driving source of inflation on the grounds that labor’s share of income
shows counter-cyclical patterns. Given the pros and cons of each series, we include both
series in the information set as the driving sources of inflation. The test of the efficient
use of available information is described by the following equation:
αt+1 = µ+ δ1st−k+ δ2yt−k+ θ1rt−k+ θ2rt−k−1+ θ3rt−k−2+ θ4rt−k−3+ θ5rt−k−4+ωt+1. (6)
where k ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4], and st, yt and rt denote labor income share, the output gap, and the
real interest rate, respectively. Table 3 reports estimates for k ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4]7. We consider
four different cases due to the possibility of data revision. We expect that minor revisions
will occur in the explanatory variables with longer lags.
[Insert Table 3 Here]
We find that biases from the SPF and the Green Book are mostly explained by the
output gap, labor’s share of income, and the real interest rate. The measure of goodness-
of-fit, R2, obtained is at least 0.60 across several specifications. The coefficients on the
output gap and labor’s share of income are highly significant at the 5% significant level
for all different cases.8 The ex-post real interest rate also plays a crucial role in accounting
for bias. While the potential driving forces of inflation in the literature have a positive
relationship with bias, the ex-post real interest rate is negatively related. These results
imply that forecasters have under-reacted to changes in variables in the information set.
For example, the positive coefficient on the output gap implies that forecasters tend to
under-react to an increase (a decrease) in the output gap because realized inflation is
higher (lower) than the predicted one. The coefficient on labor’s share of income could be
interpreted in the same way. Similarly, the negative coefficient on the ex-post real interest
rate suggests that the effect of a decrease (an increase) in the ex-post real interest rate
on inflation is under-estimated because realized inflation tends to be higher (lower) than
7In the case of k=1, the ex-post real interest rate at time t-1 may not be observed. However, our
results are similar for k ∈ [1, 2, 3, 4]
8Given the criticism regarding output gap for potential measurement error and data revision, we
replace it with the unemployment rate, which is subject to minor measurement error and revision. We
obtain very similar results for the unemployment rate with an even higher R2. The results are available
from the authors’ upon request.
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predicted, causing higher (lower) forecast errors.9 We view these results as a rejection of
the rational expectations hypothesis.
Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) attempt to rationalize bias and the inefficient use
of available information in the observed inflation forecasts such as the SPF and Michigan
Survey by assuming that agents may update information infrequently. As we discuss in
the previous section, biases from the SPF and the Green Book show a similar pattern
suggesting that it would be more appropriate to use a unified framework that is able
to explain both biases. In this sense, their effort to rationalize bias and the inefficient
use of available information on the basis of informational rigidities has to work for both
forecasts. However, it is hard to reconcile that the Fed, which closely monitors the state
of the economy, would collect information infrequently. We also cast doubts on the claim
that informational rigidities faced by professional forecasters could lead to bias and the
inefficient use of available information in the observed inflation expectations from the
SPF. The data set we employ are publicly available without any costs to professional
forecasters.
Finally, Table 3 suggests that the Fed’s forecasters may be more efficient than pro-
fessional forecasters since only the first two lags of the real interest rate are significant
in explaining bias from the Green Book. This finding is consistent with the results from
Table 2, which shows that inflation forecasts from the SPF can be further improved than
forecasts from the Green Book.
[Insert Figure 2 Here] [Insert Figure 3 Here]
Figures 2 and 3 plot biases and the fitted values for k = 1 to illustrate how well
the fitted values provide a good prediction to biases from the SPF and the Green Book,
respectively. The variables we employ account for biases reasonably well, fitting a series of
negative and positive biases. The fitted values even predict two important turning points
around 1980 and 2000 very closely. In both cases, the first turning point from a positive
to a negative sign of the bias is consistent with the period that Volcker took office as a
chairman of the Fed. In this respect, we further investigate the effect of the real interest
rate on the bias.
[Insert Figure 4 Here]
9See Ball and Croushore (2003), Mankiw, Reis and Wolfers (2003) for these interpretations.
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Figure 4 displays negative the real interest rate, −rt, and biases from the SPF and
the Green Book to highlight their negative relationship. Biases move with negative the
real interest rate (−rt), implying that its level is closely connected with shifts in the real
interest rate. In the pre-Volcker period, when the real interest rate was relatively low,
forecasters underestimated its effect on the inflation rate, leading to under-prediction
in inflation forecasts. In contrast to the pre-Volcker period, the real interest rate was
relatively higher during the Volcker-Greenspan era, especially from 1980 to 2000. Again,
the forecasts underestimated the negative effect of the high real interest rate on inflation,
leading to over-prediction of future inflation expectations. Finally, since 2000, forecasters
started to underestimate the effect of low real interest rate on inflation, further increasing
the level of biases. Overall, findings indicate that the real interest rate plays a crucial
role in explaining under- or over-prediction of inflation expectations, thus determining the
level of biases. Since the output gap and labor income share display a cyclical pattern, it
is less plausible that they account for the level of biases. Although we do not report here,
residuals from a regression of biases on only the output gap, labor income share, and a
constant, display very similar movements with the level of biases. This result shows that
the potential driving forces of inflation cannot account for the level of biases. Overall,
our findings indicate that biases in the SPF and the Green Book forecasts are mostly
driven by the inefficient use of available information and cast doubt on the validity of the
rational expectations hypothesis.
4 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the controversial literature that investigates the rational expec-
tations hypothesis. We propose an alternative test of the rational expectations hypothesis
in which the potential bias is time-varying. The test measures the degree of persistence
in systematic mistakes obtained by solving a signal extraction problem that distinguishes
between systematic and non-systematic forecast errors. Our findings indicate that sys-
tematic mistakes are highly persistent and predictable. Moreover, systematic mistakes
are mostly driven by the inefficient use of available information; thus rejecting the ratio-
nal expectations hypothesis. This paper also documents evidence that the ex-post real
interest rate plays a crucial role in explaining the level of bias, illustrating the difficulty
– even for the Fed’s forecasters – to predict the effect of real interest rate on inflation.
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Table 1: Estimation Results
Inflation Forecasts φ σ² σν
SPF
0.927** 0.793** 0.135
(0.043) (0.135) (0.080)
Green Book
0.916** 0.708** 0.104
(0.052) (0.122) (0.067)
Note: ** indicates statistical significance at the 5% significance level. Estimation results are obtained
using equation (3) and (4).
Table 2: Root Mean Square Error
Forecast
Without With Using Information % Change
Bias Correction Bias Correction Available in Improvement
SPF 1.359
1.069 at t 21.3%
1.141 at t-1 16.0%
Green Book 1.187
0.997 at t 16.0%
1.028 at t-1 13.4%
Note: The root mean square error (RMSE) is
√
(1/T )
∑t=T
t=0 e
2
t where et is forecast error for period t.
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Table 3: Sources of Bias: SPF and Green Book (GB)
Data δ1 δ2 θ1 θ2 θ3 θ4 θ5 R
2
SPF
k=1
0.051** 0.140** -0.120** -0.034** -0.017 -0.035** -0.037*
0.72
(0.011) (0.027) (0.022) (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021)
k=2
0.048** 0.150** -0.099** -0.022 -0.037** -0.036** -0.038**
0.71
(0.010) (0.031) (-0.019) (-0.021) (-0.018) (0.015) (0.019)
k=3
0.045** 0.158** -0.072** -0.043** -0.038** -0.034* -0.039*
0.70
(0.010) (0.036) (0.020) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
k=4
0.039** 0.156** -0.078** -0.047** -0.034 -0.040** -0.022
0.68
(0.010) (0.040) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) (0.024)
GB
k=1
0.049** 0.119** -0.090** -0.031** -0.029 -0.017 0.019
0.72
(0.009) (0.025) (0.019) (0.013) (0.017) (0.014) (0.017)
k=2
0.047** 0.129** -0.083** -0.033* -0.022 0.000 0.001
0.69
(0.009) (0.030) (0.018) (0.019) (0.016) (0.012) (0.017)
k=3
0.044** 0.135** -0.078** -0.028* -0.007 -0.017 0.002
0.66
(0.009) (0.034) (0.022) (0.017) (0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
k=4
0.041** 0.133** -0.071** -0.015 -0.023 -0.018 0.005
0.60
(0.009) (0.038) (0.018) (0.017) (0.024) (0.017) (0.026)
Note: ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5%, 10% significance level. Estimation of equation
(6) is conducted by the Ordinary Least Squares considering Newey-West HAC Standard Errors and
Covariance (lag truncation=4). Sample ranges from 1968Q4 to 2005Q4 for the SPF and from 1968Q4 to
2001Q4 for the Green Book.
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Figure 1: Biases and Forecast Errors (pit+1 − Eˆtpit+1)
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Figure 2: Fitted Value (Equagion 6) and Bias from the SPF
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Figure 3: Fitted Value (Equagion 6) and Bias from the Green Book
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Figure 4: Biases and the Real Interest Rate
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Note: Each series is normalized around zero and one-standard deviation.
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